Summary
The applicants were Czech children of Roma descent, between nine and 15 years old, who had been placed in “special schools” for children with mental disabilities between 1996 and 1999. Their situation was not unique. In 1999, the probability of a Roma child of being assigned to a “special school” was more than 27 times higher than for a non-Roma child.
The applicants argued before the ECtHR that segregation based on race or ethnic origin consisted a violation of the right to education, recognized in Article 14 of the ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), read in connection with Article 2 of Protocol 1 (right to education). They also argued it was a violation of the right to fair trial, recognized in Article 6 of the ECHR, and of Article 3, regarding degrading treatment. The complaints under Articles 3 and 6 were declared inadmissible.
In 2007, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that there had been indirect discrimination against the applicants in the context of education, finding a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1. The ruling emphasized that the Convention addressed not only specific acts of discrimination against individuals, but also structural arrangements and institutionalized practices that violated the human rights of racial or ethnic groups.
Recognizing the Roma as a vulnerable minority requiring special protection, the Court noted that this case warranted particular attention. The Court held that it was not “satisfied that the difference in treatment between Roma children and non-Roma children was objectively and reasonably justified and that there existed a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means used and the aim pursued” (para. 208). In addressing the issue of parental consent, the Court underscored that the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination cannot be waived, as it would be counter to an important public interest.
The ECtHR explicitly applied the principle of indirect discrimination (paras. 185-195), clarifying that such discrimination may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group. Indirect discrimination does not necessarily require discriminatory intent (para. 194). The Court noted that in assessing the impact of a measure or practice on an individual or group, reliable and significant statistics may be accepted (but are not essential) to constitute prima facie evidence of indirect discrimination. The Court affirmed that prima facie establishment of discrimination shifts the burden of proof “to the respondent State, which must show that the difference in treatment is not discriminatory” (para. 189). The Court also recognized that “it would be extremely difficult in practice for applicants to prove indirect discrimination without such a shift in the burden of proof” (para. 189).
The Court referenced relevant human rights jurisprudence extensively, including international human rights treaties, for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the general comments/recommendations of UN treaty bodies, and comparative case law.
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction), the Court awarded 4000 euros to each applicant as non-pecuniary damages, and 10,000 euros jointly for costs and expenses.